Unfair Competition--Injunction--Trade Names-- Shredded Wheat  (Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 13 
Number 2 Volume 13, April 1939, Number 2 Article 24 
May 2014 
Unfair Competition--Injunction--Trade Names--"Shredded Wheat" 
(Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1939) "Unfair Competition--Injunction--Trade Names--"Shredded Wheat" (Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 13 : No. 2 , Article 24. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss2/24 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
untary act, places himself in a position of danger, he cannot recover
for the resultant injury. The rule of contracts that the law will not
allow the plaintiff to take advantage of his own default to the detri-
ment of the innocent defendant would be applied. The fundamental
basis of a warranty is the reliance by the buyer on the superior knowl-
edge of the seller; thus where both parties have the same knowledge
the law does not imply a warranty. Here the dangerous properties
of the fluid were made known to the plaintiff. It was because of this
that the plaintiff had no remedy.' 5
H. P. M.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-INJUNcTION-TRADE NAMES-"SHRED-
DED WHIEAT".-The complainant, National Biscuit Co., sought to en-
join the defendant, Kellogg Co., from manufacturing shredded wheat
biscuits in a pillow-shaped form and from selling them under the name
of "Shredded Wheat". The complainant claimed the exclusive right
to make shredded wheat biscuits in a pillow-shaped form, and the ex-
clusive right to designate them by the trade name "Shredded Wheat".
The defendant was accused of unfair competition on the ground that
its use of the form and the trade name was, allegedly, calculated to
"pass off" the defendant's goods for those of the complainant. It
was shown that although the basic patent for the manufacture of
shredded wheat by the Shredded Wheat Co.' had expired in 1912,
the Kellogg Co. did not compete with the Shredded Wheat Co. until
1927, after the said company had expended over seventeen million
dollars in creating a great demand for its product. However, in com-
peting for the same market in which the complain nt sold its goods,
the defendant used all reasonable means to prevent the public from
confusing the source of the goods. The standard Kellogg cartons
were strikingly dissimilar in size, form and color from the cartons
of the complainant. They were distinctively labeled "Kellogg Shred-
ded Whole Wheat Biscuit" so as to strike the eye of even an unwary
purchaser as being a Kellogg product. The defendant's cartons con-
cleaning fluid which had been spilled on the floor. Judgment was given for the
plaintiff on the ground that the defendants were chargeable with negligence in
marketing into homes such quantities of a dangerous fluid. Unanimously
affirmed without opinion, 248 App. Div. 697 (1st Dept. 1936).
The basis of an implied warranty is justifiable reliance on judgment and
skill of the warrantor, as shown by the particular circumstances. Ford v.
Waldorf System, - R. I. -, 188 At. 633 (1936). "The purpose and use of
the implied warranty is to promote high standards in business and to discourage
sharp dealings. It rests upon the principle that honesty is the best policy and
contemplates business transactions in which both parties may profit. Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
'To whose business and goodwill the complainant had succeeded in 1930.
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tained fifteen biscuits; those of the complainant contained twelve bis-
cuits. On certiorari to review the decree granting an injunction
against the defendant, held, reversed. The above facts do not present
evidence of unfair competition. Upon the expiration of the basic
patents not only the right to manufacture the biscuits in pillow-sbaped
form, but also the right to designate them as "Shredded Wheat" were
dedicated to the public. The name, shredded wheat, is a generic term,
and since it had never acquired a "secondary meaning", the complain-
ant could not claim an exclusive right to its use. Kellogg Co. v. Na-
tioial Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 59 Sup. Ct. 109 (1938).
In 1742, failing to find any precedents in favor of an injunction
in competition cases, Lord Hardwicke refused to enjoin a trader from
using another's mark.2  But in 1886 this holding was rejected when
Judge Wallace said: "All practices which tend to engender unfair
competition are odious and will be suppressed by injunction." 3 Un-
fair competition, strictly speaking, consists in so dressing or represent-
ing one's own goods, whether by a deceptive use of another's trade-
mark or in whatsoever manner possible by human ingenuity, so as
to enable one to pass off upon the public his own goods or business as
and for the goods or business of another.4 The underlying principle
of the law of unfair competition is that one is not entitled to reap
profits from the goodwill and reputation which another has built up
for his goods and business,5 and that such goodwill and reputation is
a property right, or a business right.6 It is because unfair competi-
tion is an invasion of this property right 7 that equity is warranted in
exercising its extraordinary power in granting relief against such com-
2Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742).
Estes v. Leslie, 27 Fed. 22 (C. C. S. D. 1886) ; Cox, The Prevention of
Unfair Competition in Business (1891) 5 HARV. L. Rlv. 139, 145.
'Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.5. 665, 21 Sup.
Ct. 270 (1901); Sayre v. McGill Ticket Punch Co., 200 Fed. 771 (N. D. Ill.
1912).
'iMcLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877); Criterion Advertising Co. v.
Seely, 4 F. (2d) 932 (D. C. Mass. 1925).
6 Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901). Such
business rights are incorporeal property rights, which include copyrights, pat-
ents, trade secrets, trade names, trade-marks and -the right to make profits by
carrying on business. WALSH, EQUITY (1930) § 41. Each of these rights
affords different protection in enabling the one protected to realize profits.
Baker v. Libie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912) (copyrights protect the
peculiar juxtaposition of the words of the particular author, but not the author's
ideas embodied in his composition) ; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 Sup. Ct. 748 (1906) (patents protect the
invezltor's ideas) ; Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N. Y. 264,
30 N . E. 506 (1892) (trade secrets are protected as long as the inventor
refrains from publishing them); Waterman Pen Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235
U. S. 88, 35 Sup. Ct. 91 (1914) (trade-marks are given exclusive use to the
first appropriator); Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198
U. S. 118, 25 Sup. Ct. 609 (1905) (trade names are afforded protection against
fraudulent simulation).
7Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 122 Fed. 105 (C. C. N. J. 1903) (unfair
competition is a tort).
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petition. 8 Thus equity, in requiring competitors to act fairly in solicit-
ing the public patronage, is, in effect, setting up a code of ethics for
business.9 The courts uniformly hold that a complainant must show
a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant as a prerequisite to
his obtaining an injunction in cases of competition.' 0 Yet it is con-
ceded that, where the defendant's goods are mistaken for those of the
complainant, the injury to the complainant is the same whether or not
the defendant intended to deceive the public as to the true source of
the goods.". The purchaser will frequently confuse the producers of
a product when two competing manufacturers offer a similar product
for sale under the same trade name, and a buyer asking for shredded
wheat, intending to buy the product of the National Biscuit Co., may
be handed the product of Kellogg Co. Such confusion of source re-
sults in an injury to the goodwill and reputation of the manufacturer
who had first appropriated the trade name and expended a large sum
of money in making it a household term.'2
It is the general rule that a generic term, accurately describing
a product, cannot be exclusively appropriated as a trade name.'3
Where a producer first begins to manufacture a product and procures
a patent to protect the process of the manufacture he will have the ex-
clusive right to call that product by its descriptive name, as long as
the monopoly created by the patent exists.' 4 But, upon the expira-
tion of the patent, the right to manufacture the product is dedicated
to the public, and, in conjunction therewith, the right to call the prod-
'This is in accordance with the maxim, "aequitas agit in personamn," where
a property right is involved. See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case
Co., 179 U. S. 665, 21 Sup. Ct. 270 (1901). There is no adequate remedy at
law. WALSH, EQUITY (1930) § 41. Though some cases hold that relief is also
granted on the theory of protecting the public from being deceived into accept-
ing the defendant's goods as those of complainant (Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co. v. Wathen, 110 Fed. 641 (W. D. Ky. 1901), the greater weight
of authority seems to hold that the sole basis for relief in unfair competition is
to protect the complainant's property right in his trade. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. Allen Bros. Tobacco Co., 151 Fed. 819 (W. D. Va. 1907).
'Armour & Co. v. Master Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F. (2d) 201 (S. D. Ohio
1925). However, it may be safely said that the present standard of business
ethics is not very high. Indeed, the evolution of the law of unfair competition
is, as yet, not complete. But the general trend is towards the application of
more ethical standards in response to the agitations of the administrative agen-
cies and legislative bodies. For an interesting treatment of the development of
the law see Note (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 1171.
"United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co., 221 Fed. 456 (E. D.
N. Y. 1915).
"American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F. (2d) 488 (E. D.
Mich. 1930).
'Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 16 Sup. Ct 1002
(1896).
'DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 601, 57 Sup. Ct. 193 (1936).
"Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 16 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1896).
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uct by its generic or descriptive name also vests in the public. 15 This
public right to manufacture a product, not protected by a patent, and
to designate it by its generic name, cannot be lost by delay,16 for any
member of the public may elect to exercise such a right at any time.
It is true, however, that a generic term acquiring a "secondary mean-
ing" may confer upon the original producer an exclusive right to its
use.17 But, to be entitled to protection under the principle of "secon-
dary meaning" it must be shown that the producer and not the product
has become primarily associated with the generic term in the minds
of the consuming public.' 8 There is no doubt but that the defendant,
in selling his product under its generic name, causes damage to the
original producer of the same product under the same name; for, even
though the defendant uses all means to identify the product as his own,
short of completely dropping the name necessary to describe it, still
he will inevitably share in the business and good will of the original
producer.' 9 But it must be remembered that the generic name de-
scribing a product, unprotected by any patent, is "publici juris".20
And thus, one cannot be accused of doing any wrong if he does that
which he has a right to do, even though the exercise of such right
consequently redounds to another's damage. It is, in such .a case,
"damnum absque injurid'.2 1
E.S.S.
'Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918) ; Win. Worner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526, 44 Sup. Ct.
615 (1924) (the name and the form of a product together pass to the public
upon the expiration of a patent).
. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 16 Sup. Ct. 1002
(1896).
'*Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), modified, 29
F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
' Richmond Remedies Co. v. Dr. Miles Medical Co., 16 F. (2d) 598
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
" Ibid.
' DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 601, 57 Sup. Ct. 193 (1936).
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918).
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